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This paper focuses on the political impact of the indictment of the Sudanese president, Omar al-
Bashir, by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The paper analyses the effect that the two arrest 
warrants had on politics in Sudan, and the reactions and actions that the indictment sparked around the 
world. At a local level, the arrest warrant has done little to introduce a culture of accountability or to 
bring peace to Darfur. Regionally, the al-Bashir indictments have strengthened anti-ICC sentiment and 
sparked an aggressive backlash by the African Union. Finally, on the world stage, Arab states have 
strongly supported the Sudanese government’s position against the ICC whilst developing nations have 
prioritised economic affairs over human rights and Western powers have shown passivity in wanting to 
implement the warrant. All in all, the indictment of al-Bashir has damaged the credibility of the court at a 
global level and failed to bring justice to the people of Darfur. 
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Questo articolo analizza l’impatto politico, sia sul fronte interno, sia su quello internazionale della 
messa in stato di accusa e dei due mandati di arresto emessi dalla Corte Penale Internazionale (CPI) ai 
danni del presidente del Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir. A livello locale, l’incriminazione non sembra aver 
prodotto alcun risultato di rilievo nel promuovere la cultura della responsabilità, né tantomeno nel 
processo di pacificazione in Sudan. Al contrario, l’imputazione di Omar al-Bashir ha rafforzato il 
sentimento anti CPI e ha scatenato una reazione violenta da parte dell’Unione africana. Sulla scena 
mondiale, al sostegno degli stati arabi alla posizione del governo sudanese si accompagna la sostanziale 
indifferenza al problema da parte dei paesi in via di sviluppo, più sensibili al sostegno economico che agli 
interventi a difesa dei diritti umani da parte della comunità internazionale; mentre le potenze occidentali 
temporeggiano e tardano a rendere effettivo il mandato di arresto. Da questo quadro emerge chiaramente 
quanto la credibilità della Corte Penale Internazionale, lungi dall’aver portato giustizia al popolo del 
Darfur, ne risulti danneggiata. 
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Introduction	  	  
The signing of the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 marked a watershed in the history of global 
justice, laying out the legal framework for the world’s first permanent international criminal 
court. The idea of creating a tribunal that would try individuals for heinous crimes, including 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes had been floated in the wake of World War 
II but it was not until the end of the Cold War that the project took on a concrete expression. 
The 1990s proved to be a fertile decade for international justice during which the global 
community was receptive to the idea of the institutionalisation of a permanent court. Clearly not 
all States embraced the idea enthusiastically; on the contrary, a number of countries, including 
three permanent members of the UN Security Council, showed serious reservations about the 
threat that such an institution might pose to national sovereignty. But in a particular moment in 
history, in which the bipolar order of the Cold War had dissolved, and the world was not yet 
paralysed by post-9/11 security concerns, a number of ‘smaller’ unified states, led by Canada, 
Germany and Italy, succeeded in pushing the project forward, while the powers most concerned 
about the project failed to create a strong opposing front to block the birth of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) (Bosco, 2014). 
As the ICC, with its seat in The Hague, became an established feature of the global 
institutional architecture, a key question was which criminals should be brought before the 
Court. With limited resources, and in a world ridden with violence and conflict, the Court could 
hear just a sprinkling of cases against a few perpetrators of the worst crimes against humanity 
committed around the globe. But precisely because of its nature, there were no obvious 
candidates to be the first indicted by the ICC. Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, was one 
of the unlucky few to fall under the scrutiny of the ICC prosecution office in the Court’s early 
days.  
To date, nine situations, all in Africa, have been brought before the ICC. The investigation 
into the civil war in Darfur, in Western Sudan, was not the opening case, but it has proven to be 
one of the most controversial given that for the first time, the ICC issued an arrest warrant 
against a sitting head of State. Many questioned the wisdom of indicting al-Bashir for the 
political chaos that it might bring to Sudan, and to Africa more generally. Amongst the issues 
raised were: Can the Court legitimately interfere with a country’s domestic political process by 
indicting an incumbent head of State? Do indictments facilitate peace negotiations in areas of 
on-going conflict, or does it simply aggravate the situation? And what is the effect of an 
indictment on accountability mechanisms in the targeted country? 
The ICC’s involvement in areas of on-going conflict goes to the heart of the contentious 
peace versus justice debate; does justice pave the way for peace or vice-versa? Benjamin 
Ferencz (1983), the youngest prosecutor of the Nuremberg trials and one of the most vocal 
advocates of the need for a permanent tribunal, argued that ‘that there can be no peace without 
justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just and 
lawful under any given circumstance’. But the decision by the ICC to get involved in areas of 
conflict has been hotly debated, as it has consistently failed to demonstrate how peace will be 
brought about.  
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The case of Darfur constituted a precedent for indicting a sitting head of State, but it marked 
a first in another way: never before had the Security Council referred a situation to the Court. 
This is one of three ways in which, according to Article 13 of the Rome Statute, a case may be 
brought to the ICC. The other two avenues involve either a referral by a State Party into crimes 
committed in its jurisdiction or the opening of an investigation by the Court’s chief prosecutor. 
Critics of the ICC have argued that the Security Council’s power of referral opens the 
possibility for politics to become enmeshed with justice as permanent members may choose to 
veto a deferral to the ICC depending on political allegiances; the opposing view sees this 
mechanism as crucial to the international body’s efforts to maintain peace and international 
order.  
As one of the first and most controversial cases, the indictment of al-Bashir has been 
significant in shaping attitudes to the nascent Court. The case has exposed some of the ICC’s 
greatest shortcomings; most notably, the lack of enforcement mechanisms at its disposal.1 At 
best, states have threatened to arrest the Sudanese president if he enters their country, at worst, 
ICC members have actively invited him to their territory, ignoring their obligations under the 
Rome Statute which establishes that all Member States have the duty to cooperate with all the 
Court’s warrants. If members states themselves defy ICC orders, then how does this impact on 
the credibility of the Court? Even those states most ideologically committed to the idea of 
international justice have acted passively on the issue of enacting the Court’s warrants, as other 
issues have overtaken on the international agenda.  
This paper analyses the political impact, both in Sudan and internationally, of the two arrest 
warrants issued by the ICC against al-Bashir. Whereas the legal consequences for the indictee 
have, so far, been minimal, the political effects of the indictments are more discernable. The 
discussion will begin with a description of how and why al-Bashir came to attention of 
prosecutors in The Hague. The paper will then look at how the Sudanese government reacted to 
the arrest warrant against its president, before in turn considering the various responses of the 
international community.  
The indictments against al-Bashir have undoubtedly contributed to bolstering anti-ICC 
sentiment. There has been a fervent political backlash by the African Union (AU) and the Arab 
League with many accusing the ICC of acting as an instrument of ‘neo-colonial’ justice. The 
fact that the Court has only prosecuted African leaders has reinforced the perception of a system 
of global justice which is highly selective and the persuasive critique which asserts that a dual 
system of global justice has been created with one set of rules for the globe’s most powerful, 
and another for the weakest (Köchler, 2003; Zolo, 2009). Omar al-Bashir has become a 
standard-bearer for these imbalances in global prosecutions and his indictment, far from having 
the effect of withdrawing him from political life, has brought him into the spotlight.  
1.	  Darfur:	  A	  case	  for	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  
The Rome Statute came into force on 1 July 2002. As the young Court began to take shape 
and leading experts in international law were appointed to lead its work, the prosecutor’s office 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a more in-depth discussion, see Barnes, 2011.  
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considered which cases to investigate. But in its state of infancy, the ICC’s foundations had to 
be consolidated upon carefully, and overly contentious cases which might upset major-power 
interests avoided (Bosco, 2014). The initial situations investigated by the Court’s first chief 
prosecutor, the Argentine Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stemmed from a referral made by two Member 
States, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), against the activities of 
insurgent groups. The first case concerned the violence in Northern Uganda inflicted by the 
armed rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), between 2002 and 2004. A number of LRA 
leaders, most prominently Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, were investigated for crimes against 
humanity including forced child enlistment and mass murder and indicted in July 2005. The 
second case focused on the war crimes committed by Thomas Lubanga, leader of the insurgency 
group Union Patriotic Congolais (UPC), and a number of his collaborators in the Ituri region of 
the DRC. Lubanga would later become, in 2012, the first individual ever to be sentenced by the 
ICC.2  
As the prosecutor’s office was busy investigating its first two cases, the on-going conflict in 
Darfur, in Western Sudan, became the focus of international attention. Bloodshed had erupted in 
Darfur in early 2003 when two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked El Fasher airport. The rebels 
were primarily from non-Arab communities, including the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit groups, 
and were protesting against long-standing marginalisation of their communities. The 
government retaliated brutally to the attack, sending the infamous Janjaweed militia groups and 
government forces to Darfur to stamp out the rebellion. What ensued was a terrific scorched 
earth policy implemented by pro-government militias, destroying hundreds of non-Arab 
communities across the region. Rape, torture, murder and pillaging were systematic, and 
millions lost their lives and livelihoods. The Sudanese government justified the violence on the 
grounds of ‘counter-insurgency’, but vast swaths of the victims appeared to be ordinary 
civilians. The exact number of dead and displaced has been the subject of controversy; by early 
2005, the United Nations estimated that more than 200,000 Darfurians, mostly originating from 
non-Arab tribes, had been killed by both sides, and just under 2 million displaced.3	  The 
Sudanese government’s estimate is, unsurprisingly, much lower.  
The spiralling bloodshed did not go unnoticed by spectators abroad, in part due to an 
energetic campaign by transnational advocacy networks. In 2004, the US Congress declared that 
the violence in Darfur amounted to genocide.4 The International Commission on Inquiry on 
Darfur, appointed by the United Nations Security Council to investigate the violence committed 
by all sides,5 did not coincide with this view, however. When it produced its final report, the 
conclusion was that ‘the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some 
tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  See The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-91/06. 
3  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005, Geneva. 
4  ‘US House calls ‘Darfur’ genocide’, BBC, 23 July 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi /world/ 
africa/3918765.stm.  
5  S.C.Res.1564, U.N. doc. S/RES/1564 (18 September 2004). 
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on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds’.6 Although the report, headed by Antonio 
Cassese, refuted the claim of genocide, it recommended that in light of the inadequacies of the 
judicial criminal system in Sudan, the Security Council should refer the situation to the ICC. It 
argued that the involvement by the ICC was ‘the only credible way of bringing alleged 
perpetrators to justice’ and pointed to six major merits of a referral including the positive impact 
that it could have on peace and security in Darfur.	   
On 31 March 2005, the Security Council followed the recommendations laid out in the 
report by voting to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC. Eleven council members approved 
Resolution 1593,7  while four − United States, China, Brazil and Algeria − abstained from the 
vote. Since Sudan had not ratified the Rome Statute, and Sudanese nationals had committed the 
alleged crimes against fellow citizens, a Security Council referral was the only avenue open for 
the ICC to investigate the case. The decision by the United States not to exercise its veto powers 
to block such a referral was surprising given its fervent opposition to the ICC; the fact that the 
decision was presented as a choice between facilitating impunity or granting justice may have 
been the swaying motive behind its abstention (Bosco, 2014).  
With the go-ahead from the Security Council and the violence still ragging on in Darfur, the 
prosecutor’s office began to investigate the conflict in the Sudanese region in mid-2005. It 
decided not to send investigators into Darfur itself, judging that adequate protection could not 
be guaranteed to the witnesses, and instead chose to focus on testimonies from victims who had 
fled to neighbouring regions as well as on documentation from NGOs. Initially, the Sudanese 
government was fairly cooperative, complying with requests by ICC delegates for interviews 
with officials. 
The Court produced its first two indictments against Sudanese nationals in April 2007. 
Ahmed Haroun, a senior government minister and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader, 
were both accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both were convicted on 51 
counts including the murder of civilians, primarily belonging to the Fur ethnic group, and forced 
displacement amongst other charges. Unsurprisingly, the calls to hand over the two indicted 
individuals to the ICC were met on deaf ears by Sudanese authorities. But the Court did not stop 
there and went even further up the chain of command. In July 2008, the chief prosecutor 
presented the case against President al-Bashir who had come to power some twenty years earlier 
in the midst of a civil war that had torn the country apart. In 1989, he led a military coup and in 
the early 1990s fast consolidated a repressive regime intolerant of dissent; his government 
clamped down on opposition, civil society and the media.  
Omar al-Bashir was indicted on 4 March 2009 on five counts of crimes against humanity and 
two counts of war crimes. The following year, in July 2010, issued a second warrant for 
President al-Bashir, this time on three counts of genocide. The decision to issue a second set of 
charges was criticised by a number of experts given that no international consensus had been 
found on whether the violence perpetrated against members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
did in fact constituted ‘genocide’. It was argued that an additional set of charges would only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. 
7  S.C.Res.1593, U.N. doc. S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005). 	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cause further retaliation by the Sudanese government and endanger the already fragile search for 
peace in Darfur (Flint and de Waal, 2009). 
 
Table	  1:	  Timeline:	  The	  indictment	  of	  Omar	  al-­‐Bashir	  
	  
 
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  	  
2.	  Domestic	  impact	  of	  the	  indictments	  	  
The issuing of an arrest warrant for al-Bashir attracted strong criticism for its potential 
impact on the situation in Sudan and for the failure of the ICC to explain exactly how the 
indictment would improve the situation in Darfur. Was it really wise to indict a sitting head of 
State? Would it produce tangible benefits? Few disagreed with the need to introduce a culture of 
accountability in Sudan, but many argued that only once peace had been obtained, could justice 
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be sought.8 Among the concerns raised was the possibility that the Sudanese government would 
respond to an ICC warrant with fierce reprisals, which would affect the already-dire conditions 
of the millions of war-afflicted Sudanese. An indictment would only make the regime more 
intransigent and less willing to compromise. There were fears of the potential unravelling of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) − an accord which paved the way for a referendum on 
the independence of South Sudan − and the collapse of which could cause civil war. A 
premeditated move to arrest al-Bashir might leave a power vacuum in Sudan which could be 
filled by destabilising forces, including by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.9 The worst 
prophecies that the CPA would disintegrate with the issuing of an ICC warrant did not 
materialise, however; South Sudan successfully seceded in July 2011. But neither has the ICC’s 
intervention radically modified government conduct in Darfur, nor has it led to the adoption of 
meaningful domestic remedies to address the lack of accountability in Sudan or to serve the 
interests of justice of the Sudanese people. It has certainly not provided peace between pro-
government and rebel groups. 
The impact of the ICC’s involvement in Sudan can be broken down into several phases. The 
Sudanese government’s relationship with the Court changed overtime from one of modest 
compliance to outright rejection as it became clear that it would not succeed in persuading the 
international community to suspend the investigations into Darfur (Nouwen, 2013). During the 
first stage, when the president had not yet been indicted, the Sudanese government tried to curry 
favour with the Security Council to use its power to defer an investigation, through Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute. The article confers power to the Security Council to suspend ICC 
investigations for one year, on a renewable basis, although it has never been used to date. To try 
to win over the good will of the Security Council, therefore, the governing National Congress 
Party (NCP) implemented a series of domestic reforms. In parallel, the government exerted 
diplomatic muscle on African and Arab states to pressure the international community into 
deferring the proceedings. Al-Bashir’s government believed that by showing a commitment to 
finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Darfur, at the same time as appearing to bolster 
domestic accountability mechanisms, external actors would be satisfied and drop charges 
against Sudanese nationals. But these reforms were more style than substance and once it 
became clear that no referral would be gained and above all, once the Sudanese president 
himself had been indicted, then the Sudanese government adopted a more belligerent attitude 
towards the ICC, and ceased to cooperate entirely with the Court. 
Among the political measures introduced to placate the prosecutor’s office was the Sudan’s 
People Initiative, a national consultation that invited an array of different groups to join in a 
dialogue on the future of Darfur in August 2008. The government presented it as a long-term 
political solution to the conflict but political opponents and victims of the conflict were not so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See critiques by Sudan experts Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, ‘Justice Off Course in Darfur’, 
Washington Post, 28 June 2008; and by former US envoy Andre Natsios, ‘Waltz with Bashir, Why Arrest 
Warrant Against Sudan’s President Will Serve Neither Peace nor Justice’, Foreign Affairs, 23 March 
2009. 
9  Hamza Hendawi, ‘Indictment is Biggest Test for Sudanese leader’, Associated Press, 20 July 2008. 
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sold; they dismissed the initiative as ‘dead in the water and a cynical attempt to keep the regime 
in power’. 10 The scepticism was well founded; the initiative achieved little. 
In addition, the government set up a number of special criminal courts to handle Darfur 
prosecutions locally. These turned out to be very limited in scope, however, and tried only a 
handful of individuals on charges totally unrelated to international crimes. The ICC’s 
involvement in Sudan also prompted national legislators to incorporate international crimes into 
Sudanese legislation. In late 2007, an amendment was introduced to the Criminal Procedural 
Act, criminalising genocide and crimes against humanity at a domestic level. Again, this was a 
cosmetic change, which was politically inexpensive (Nouwen, 2013). Ultimately the reforms 
did very little to defy the culture of impunity in Sudan or to make legal authorities any less 
deferent to the executive. 
The relationship between the Sudanese government and the ICC had already deteriorated 
when Khartoum refused to hand over Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb, but it went into 
complete melt down after the Court issued the arrest warrant for al-Bashir in 2009. Immediately 
following the indictment, the government announced the expulsion from Sudan of thirteen 
international non-governmental organisations and the dissolution of three local groups for 
supposedly collaborating with the ICC and unnamed ‘foreign powers’. 11  This seriously 
endangered the international humanitarian effort and ultimately the survival of many victims, as 
70% of the 4.7 million conflict-affected Darfuris were dependent on external aid (Flint, de 
Waal, 2009). The safety of peacekeepers and relief workers was put into jeopardy, with an 
increase on incidents involving against these groups including raids on refugee camps, and the 
kidnapping of several foreign health workers. 
Another visible impact of al-Bashir’s indictment was the intensification of the vociferous 
anti-ICC campaign by the Sudanese government. National media outlets portrayed the ICC’s 
actions as part of a Western and Zionist plot to destroy Sudan and warned that anyone who 
supported its work was a traitor to the nation. The government organised rallies, mobilised tribal 
allies and affiliates, reinforced key economic sites such as oil fields and cracked down on 
organisations supportive of the Court’s decision. The stakes of supporting the Court’s 
indictment of al-Bashir became so high that most political parties, even those who fiercely 
opposed the Bashir regime, condemned the interference by the ICC in domestic affairs. For 
example, the People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the main opposition party involved in the 
negotiations for the succession of South Sudan, was warned that supporting the ICC would put 
the agreement at risk and as a result, the party avoided openly welcoming international justice in 
Sudan.  
The anti-ICC campaign was not just conducted internally but vigorous diplomatic efforts 
were made by the Sudanese government to gain the support of African, Arab and Islamic states 
against what it had called the instrument of ‘neo-colonial’ justice. Al-Bashir made sure to travel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	   ‘Darfuris say Sudan initiative dead in the water’, Sudan Tribune, 17 October 2008 at http: // www. 
Sudantribune .com/spip.php?article2,8953. 	  
11 ‘Aid groups’ expulsion still reverberating within Darfur’, UN News Centre, 11 June 2009 at http:// 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31108.  
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abroad- including to Eritrea, Egypt and Libya within three weeks of the indictment- to show that 
Sudan did not stand alone in its defiance of the ICC. In an interview with TIME magazine 
shortly after his indictment was issued, al-Bashir stated: ‘I have not felt [any] restrictions of 
movement, […] I have travelled all necessary travels. […] [the Court] is a tool to terrorize 
countries that the West thinks are disobedient’.12 
But despite outward defiance, the indictment did cause unease within the National Congress 
Party (International Crisis Group, 2009). There had been disagreements within the governing 
party about how to best handle the Darfur crisis, and the indictments of Haroun and Kushayb, 
followed by that of al-Bashir, affected internal dynamics. According to senior party members, 
there was talk of sacrificing al-Bashir for the sake of the party’s political survival, but the army 
firmly stood by the president. In the long run, al-Bashir’s power had not been significantly 
dented as he enjoyed a further two electoral successes in 2010 and in 2015. Paradoxically, the 
ICC warrant has diminished the possibility of Omar al-Bashir standing down, as if he were to 
relinquish his presidency, his case for impunity would be severely weakened and the club of 
supporters prepared to defend him on the international stage would no doubt shrink as he faded 
into history. 
And what can be said of the effect of the ICC indictment on the various peace processes 
underway in Sudan? The international warrant had little impact in bringing a peace deal on 
Darfur. It had the immediate effect of taking accountability of the negotiating agenda and 
encouraging opposition parties and rebel groups to harden their negotiating stance. But in the 
long term, it has had little visible effect. Peace negotiations on Darfur, such as the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011, between the Sudanese government and the Liberation 
and Justice Movement (LJM), failed. A recent report by the International Crisis Group (2015) 
apportions the failure not only to domestic actors, both the Sudanese governments and rebel 
groups, but also highlights the inability of the international community, especially the Security 
Council, to develop consensus about the best path to peace. Other issues have taken over on the 
international agenda, and as will be discussed subsequently, both the search for peace and 
accountability in Darfur have dropped down the priorities list and a humanitarian disaster looms 
in the region.13 The conflict in Darfur continues to rage on, with some 450,000 persons 
displaced in 2014 and another 100,000 in January 2015 alone, adding to the million long-term 
internally displaced persons who have fled since fighting erupted in 2003.14  
Meanwhile, the Sudanese government continues its policy of non-recognition and of total 
non-cooperation with the Court. Over the past five years, it has steadfastly refused to facilitate 
investigations or to comply with the now five arrests warrants issued by the international body 
against Sudanese nationals. It continues to prioritise its international crusade against the ICC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Sam Dealey, ‘Omar al-Bashir: Sudan’s Wanted Man,’ TIME, 13 August 2009 at http: // content. 
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1916107,00.html.  
13  See Eric Reeves, ‘Don’t Forget Darfur’, The New York Times, 11 February 2016, at http://www. 
nytimes. com/2016/02/12/opinion/dont-forget-darfur.html.  
14  See figures by the International Crisis Group, 2015. 
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over accountability; following an initial appearance of reform to woe the ICC into dropping 
charges, Sudanese authorities have shown little concern for bringing war criminals to account. 
3.	  Africa’s	  response	  to	  the	  indictments	  
More than any other case, the indictment of al-Bashir has galvanised anti-ICC sentiment on 
the African continent. In the first decade of the ICC’s existence, one of the harshest and most 
persistent criticisms has been its bias in indicting African leaders. The Court’s decision to target 
sitting heads of state, not just Omar al-Bashir, but also Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta in 
2011 for his alleged role in post-election violence in 2007-2008,15  has been particularly 
controversial. Why should external actors intervene in deposing democratically elected African 
leader? Does this not set a dangerous precedent for sweeping African heads of State out of 
power when they no longer curry favour with influential powers? Regional discontent originally 
centred on the potential damage that al-Bashir’s indictment would have for the peace and 
stability of Sudan with neighbouring states fearing the spill over effect. But also embedded in 
the controversy is the current status quo of world geopolitics, with Africa frustrated that its 
interests are constantly subordinated on international questions (Mills, 2012). In theory, most 
African states are not necessarily opposed to the idea of global justice, but in practice a number 
object to the way in which it is being administered with predominantly Western interests at 
heart.  
Since 2008, the African Union, an inter-governmental body made up of 54 Member States, 
has taken a strong stand against the indictment of al-Bashir, and more widely against the ICC’s 
focus on African leaders as well as the selective use of universal jurisdiction in Europe to bring 
African leaders to justice. The African Union has issued a number of resolutions critical of the 
ICC and called on Africa to unify against the arrest warrant against al-Bashir’s arrest warrant. It 
has adopted a multi-pronged response to the indictment; firstly by calling on African states, 
whether members of the ICC or not, to avoid cooperating with the arrest warrant, secondly, by 
proposing a number of reforms regarding ICC referral procedures, in particular with regard to 
the power granted to the Security Council, and thirdly, by trying to develop alternative 
mechanisms at a regional level to overcome challenges regarding peace and justice on the 
continent.  
The African Union has, from the start, opposed the arrest of Omar al-Bashir. Just a week 
after the chief prosecution filed for an arrest warrant for the President’s arrest, the African 
Union Peace and Security Council called on the UN Security Council to defer the ICC’s 
investigation through Article 16 of the Rome Statute, for the risk that it posed to the stability of 
the country. The African Union requested a deferral on a number of occasions between 2008 
and 2009 but the call was repeatedly ignored.16 In a regional meeting in July 2009, the African 
Union went one step further by declaring that Member States would not cooperate with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Charges were withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. 
16  See Communiqués of the 142nd and 151st Meetings of the Peace and Security Council, 21 July 2008 
and 22 September 2008 respectively, AU Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) Rev.1 and AU Doc. PSC /MIN 
/Comm.1(CLI). 
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arrest and surrender of al-Bashir.17 In calling for non-cooperation, the African Union was 
openly asking the 33 African countries who at the time were party to the ICC to defy their 
obligations to the Court. The call has had some practical effect in facilitating al-Bashir’s 
movements in Africa, and instead of becoming a pariah state, the plight of Sudan has attracted 
regional sympathy. He has travelled to fourteen African countries including ICC Member 
States, including Chad, Malawi and Kenya. South Africa’s refusal to arrest al-Bashir when the 
head of State attended a regional summit in June 2015 was a serious blow to the ICC and is 
symptomatic of many African states’ dwindling commitment to the current system of 
international justice. South Africa had, for a long time, been one the African nations most 
committed to the ICC but like many other states, not just in Africa, it decided that letting al-
Bashir go free was a more convenient option, both from a political and economic perspective. 
However, it would be an error to assume that African is a monolithic voice when it comes to its 
commitment, or lack of, to the ICC (Mills, 2012); some countries, such as Botswana, Ivory 
Coast and Gambia, have rejected the AU’s call for non-cooperation and have threatened to 
arrest him. But these are not the dominant voices in the African Union.  
Beyond attempts to block the progress of the Court’s case against al-Bashir, the African 
Union has sought alternatives to the question of peace and accountability in Sudan, on the one 
hand, and the reform of international criminal justice, on the other hand. Shortly after the 
indictment against the Sudanese president, it resolved to create a commission, the African 
Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, to look into the situation of Darfur. The commission 
produced a report in which it suggested the creation of a hybrid domestic-international criminal 
court to try perpetrators of gross human rights abuses in Sudan.18 Unsurprisingly, the Sudanese 
government did not take up the recommendations. With regard to global justice, the African 
Union has repeatedly called for reforms to the ICC, including changes in procedure and a 
clarification on the immunities of officials, in an attempt to exert greater influence in the 
institution. One of the suggestions, which it reiterates at regular intervals, is the transfer of the 
power of deferral under Article 16 from the Security Council to UN General Assembly. 
Frustrated at the unwillingness of other countries to reform the ICC and above all, in light of the 
preponderance of African cases investigated by the Court, the African Union has promoted an 
alternative arena for future war crimes trials, with the creation of a criminal chamber in the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, with jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide.19 It is a carefully crafted tribunal to safeguard the top leadership; the 
African Union adopted an additional amendment to the protocol to grant immunity to serving 
African leaders. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), adopted 3 July 2009, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII). 18	  	   Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and 
Reconciliation, 29 October 2009, AU Doc. PSC/AHG/2(CCVII).	  	  
19  For a more in-depth discussion on the problems associated with this development, see Murungu, 
2011, and Otiero, 2014. For the document, see Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, adopted on 1 July 2008. 
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The ratification of the Rome Statute by the majority of African states at the turn of the 
century signalled enthusiasm for consolidating a system of global punishment, but today it 
seems that the continent is at war with the ICC. So what explains the backlash against the 
institution? Perhaps African leaders, on joining the institution, hoped that it would be an 
indispensable weapon to use against their own incumbents; now that they have seen the ICC 
reach out its claws against politicians in power, they are not so sure they welcome the intrusion. 
Timing is illustrative; whereas African states continued to support the institution in its early 
years as the Court targeted outcast militia leaders from Uganda and the DRC, there was a 
brusque change in attitude when the ICC began to look into the crimes of al-Bashir. The African 
backlash has continued to gain momentum with African leaders fearing that they could be the 
next targets of an institution focused disproportionately on their continent. Faced with this 
realisation, it is unsurprising that there has been a push in the region for alternative, African-
controlled justice mechanisms, that is, an institution which can be designed by African heads of 
States on their own terms. 
4.	  Global	  responses	  to	  the	  indictments	  of	  al-­‐Bashir	  
On the whole, the international community has shown limited enthusiasm for implementing 
the arrest warrant; capturing al-Bashir is low down on the list of priorities of many 
governments, including Western ones, vehemently opposed by African and Arab states and 
treated with indifference by the likes of Russia and China.  
The Arab League has joined in Africa’s protest against the selectivity of the ICC and 
repudiated the move to indict al-Bashir. Historically, Arab countries have not been the most 
enthusiastic proponents of an international system of criminal justice; in fact, only three 
countries − Jordan, Djibouti and Comoros − are party to the Rome Statute, while seven Arab 
states voted against it in 1998. Added to this, some of Sudan’s most steadfast allies, including 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are to be found in the region. It is no surprise therefore that this corner 
of the globe has sat on Sudan’s side of the fence in the on-going battle between the ICC and the 
northeastern African country. Soon after the first arrest warrant was issued against al-Bashir, in 
March 2009, the Sudanese president attended the Arab League’s conference in Doha. At this 
meeting, Member States drafted a resolution stating that they ‘reject attempts to politicise the 
principles of international justice and using them to undermine the sovereignty, unity and 
stability of Sudan’, and promised to ‘halt the implementation of the warrant’.20 Since then, al-
Bashir has been a frequent visitor to the Gulf region, most regularly to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
making trips for bilateral meetings, medical check-ups and regional summits. 
Public opinion in this part of the globe on the whole saw the indictment of al-Bashir as a 
continuation of Western strategy aimed at undermining the Arab world. A YouGov poll 
indicates that 78% of the Arab world opposed the ICC’s decision to prosecute the Sudanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	   M. Slackman and F. Worth, ‘Often Split, Arab Leaders Unite for Sudan’s Chief,’ New York Times, 30 
March 2009.	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president for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.21  Almost three-quarters 
believed that such a move would destabilise the country. In contrast, when respondents were 
asked who should stand trial at the ICC, 80% nominated G.W. Bush, 73% Ehud Olmert, and 
53% Donald Rumsfeld. With regard to Arab leaders, 35% opted for Hosni Mubarak. 
Even governments committed to the idea of global justice, such as France and Germany, 
have shied away from implementing the ICC warrant. They have made it clear that al-Bashir is 
not welcome on their turf, but beyond that, no concrete strategy for arresting the Sudanese 
president has been elucidated. Al-Bashir has refrained from visiting ICC Member States outside 
Africa, but he has called on countries outside the ICC club on numerous occasions, and not just 
Gulf region. Although China blighted Sudan by not vetoing the UN resolution in 2005, the 
arrest warrant has not greatly modified Sino-Sudanese relations, with al-Bashir making visits to 
China in 2011 and 2015. China has, for a number of decades, provided cash and weapons to 
Sudan in exchange for vast reserves of oil, and these ties have not been severed on account of 
the ICC warrant. For other countries, economic interests have also trumped human rights. With 
Sudan rich in oil, making the country a friend rather than an enemy has been the priority. For 
example, in late 2015, India invited al-Bashir to attend the India-Africa Forum, which he duly 
did. The decision by the Indian government sparked criticism from a number of NGOs, 
including Human Rights Watch,22 but the pressure of civil organizations was insufficient to 
make the Indian government rescind its invitation.  
Table 2 shows the visits that al-Bashir has made to countries outside of Africa. The 
numerous trips that he has made abroad indicate that the ICC’s arrest warrants have not served 
to truly isolate the Sudanese leader on the world stage. True, there are some parts of the world 
which he is unable to visit freely, but he has trusted allies who have helped him to bolster his 
position against the Court in The Hague. The Sudanese president has become a living symbol of 
the movement to defy global justice, and with each visit he makes abroad, he strikes a further 
blow to the work of the ICC.  
 
Table	  2.	  Al-­‐Bashir’s	  travels:	  visits	  outside	  of	  Africa	  
 
Country ICC Member? Number of visits Motive for visit Year 
China No 2 
Peace talks 
Military 
commemoration 
2011 
2015 
India Yes 1 India-Africa Forum 2015 
Iran No 1 Non-Aligned Movement summit 2012 
Iraq No 1 Arab summit 2012 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  YouGov measures public opinion on a wide-range of issues. See ‘Sudanese President al-Bashir and 
the ICC’, YouGov Siraj, 14 May 2009. 
22  ‘India: Do Not Welcome Bashir’, Human Rights Watch, 19 October 2015.	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Kuwait No 2 Africa-Asia summit 2013 2014 
Qatar No 8 
Arab League Summit 
Bilateral talks 
Medical visit 
International 
conference 
2009/13 
2011/13/14/15 
2012 
2012 
Saudi Arabia  No 9 
Bilateral talks, Haji 
Pilgrimage, Medical 
visit 
2009/15 
2009/13/14 
2012/13 
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  data	  from	  BashirWatch.org.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The indictment of Omar al-Bashir has certainly provided publicity of the work of the ICC. 
Alas, it has been publicity of the wrong sort for global justice. The issuing of two arrest 
warrants by the ICC has sparked all kinds of political action, from the issuing of resolutions by 
regional bodies to sympathetic states welcoming the Sudanese president with open arms. It has 
certainly won support for the growing anti-ICC movement. What it has not resulted in, 
however, is a concerted effort by the international community to make this justice effective, or 
to provide an alternative settlement for the people of Darfur. As the past years have shown, even 
those states most keen about international justice are reluctant to go out the whole way to 
implementing the orders of a court which ultimately threatens to make incursions into their own 
national sovereignty. And given that the Security Council has never authorized the use of force 
to implement the warrant, nor is there is an international police force to carry out the task of 
capturing al-Bashir, the possibilities of a collaborative push to do so are remote. 
Faced with the current situation, who should take the lead? In a somewhat desperate 
proposition in The New York Times in August 2015, former ICC prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
suggested that the United States should grant al-Bashir a visa to attend the UN General 
Assembly in New York, and once on US soil, arrest and surrender him to the Court.23 Far from 
the ideal solution, an arrest by the world’s most powerful country that has itself turned its back 
on ICC membership would simply bolster the claim of Western hypocrisy and a dual system of 
justice with two sets of law for the powerful and the weak. On the other hand, had South Africa 
upheld its commitment to international punishment when al-Bashir made visited the country in 
June 2015, the move could have provided renewed confidence in the ICC. 
However, engaging in a counterfactual exercise of history will do nothing to dispel the belief 
that the ICC disburses selective, rather than universal justice. The statistics only help to bolster 
the claim; with only African leaders at the bar, it seems that skin colour and nationality are 
crucial determinants for a prosecution by the ICC. Is it a question of time? Do we need to be 
patient and wait for the ICC to become more embedded into the international institutional 
framework so that it can pursue a wider range of cases in diverse geographical areas? After all, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  ‘Let Sudan’s President Come to New York. Then Arrest Him’, The New York Times, 24 August 2015. 
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the Court is a relatively young institution and past examples such as that of Radovan Karadzic 
show that perseverance is key in international criminal justice.24 The Court has already begun 
preliminary investigations into situations in Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq amongst others, 
but there is still a long way to go, and significant political hurdles to jump, before these 
materialise into a sentence. 
Only time will tell what both al-Bashir and the ICC’s future will hold, but in the short term, 
the indictment of al-Bashir has damaged the credibility of the Court. It has shown that it lacks 
the muscle to do the job that it promised, which in part comes down to the reluctance of states to 
commit to making the project successful, especially when indictments touch so closely on 
questions of national sovereignty as is the case when a sitting head of state is targeted. The 
realisation that a global court is not only an instrument to tackle the crimes of incumbents, but 
may also scrutinise a government’s own actions, has hit hard in Africa and has led to waning 
support for the international tribunal.  
Beyond tarnishing the reputation of the Court, however, the ICC, and more widely the 
international community, the ICC has not met the expectations of peace or justice for the 
millions of victims in Sudan which the indictment against al-Bashir was designed to serve. The 
indictment of al-Bashir has brought few, if any, tangible benefits to the victims of the conflict in 
Darfur; there has been no change in leadership, no meaningful reforms to address the issue of 
accountability in Darfur, no peace, and no justice. Al-Bashir continues his tirade against global 
justice as the people of Darfur endlessly suffer. In the end, al-Bashir has proved to be right 
when he declared that the indictment of the ICC was ‘not worth the ink it was written with’.25 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  ‘Justice Delayed’, The Economist, 20 June 2015.  
25  M. Pflanz, ‘Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir says ICC can ‘eat’ his arrest warrant’, The Telegraph, 4 March 
2009, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/4933329/Sudans-
Omar-al-Bashir-says-ICC-can-eat-his-arrest-warrant.html.	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